We report the results of two field experiments to investigate the usefulness of entreaties in reducing protest zero responses in contingent valuation (CV) studies. These two experiments estimate willingness to pay for tropical biodiversity amongst distant beneficiaries and for reductions in water supply risks, respectively. The entreaties in both contexts, in essence, entailed an additional text to 'talk people out of their protests' using, respectively, a split sample test and a within sample test. Results indicate that, in both cases, these scripts were effective in significantly reducing protest zeros, with one experiment reducing protests at the payment principle stage of the valuation scenario and the other reducing protests at the payment elicitation stage. Using entreaties in this way tentatively may be a useful contribution to the existing CV literature where protests rates are high and, moreover, appear to 'defy' efforts to address the issue through best practice in the design and testing of survey instruments. However, while protests were reduced by about a third in both cases, the entreaties clearly did not eliminate a majority of protest zeros. Moreover, as we discuss, there are good reasons why the responses of 'reclaimed' protestors remain open to scrutiny.
Introduction
Many contingent valuation (CV) studies experience a high level of protest responses.
Such responses are problematic since they do not represent 'true' economic values (Jorgensen et al. 1999) . The most common type of protest response occurs where a respondent does not provide his or her genuine willingness to pay (WTP) but instead states a zero value, referred to as a protest zero (Mitchell and Carson, 1989 ). This presents a crucial problem for the analyst since there is no way to impute the true value held for the good (Bateman et al. 2002; Mitchell and Carson, 1989) .
Consequently, the typical approach to dealing with protest zeros is to remove them from the sample. This can leave the resulting welfare estimates open to bias and reduce survey efficiency.
In this paper, we focus on tackling the problem of protest zeros, through an empirical investigation of whether the number of protest zeros reported might be reduced using an entreaty. This builds, in particular, on a number of studies which have recently used entreaties such as 'cheap talk' scripts to deal with the different problem of hypothetical bias (see, for example, Brown et al. 2001; Bulte et al. 2005; Carlsson et al. 2005; Cummings and Taylor, 1999, List, 2001; Lusk, 2003; Murphy et al. 2005; Poe et al. 2002) . Despite some success at reducing hypothetical bias, the potential of these scripts for dealing with other types of contingent valuation bias largely remains unexplored. In this paper, we present two applications that explore the use of such scripts as one means to deal with, and understand, protest responses. The first estimates WTP for tropical biodiversity amongst distant beneficiaries and the entreaty is tested using a split-sample procedure. The second estimates WTP for reductions in household water supply risks and the entreaty is administered in a within-sample context.
These are, on the face of it, very different policy contexts. However, the problem of protest zeros in evaluating preferences for proposed changes in provision is, as we find, common to both. In turn, the two experiments that we outline in this paper are linked by the shared object to see how entreaties might 'talk people out of their protests' and so uncover WTP where a respondent otherwise might have registered a protest zero. This, we argue, could represent a useful contribution to the existing literature on contingent valuation where protests rate are high and, moreover, appear to 'defy' efforts to address the issue through best practice in the design and testing of survey instruments. However, we do this with a note of caution about how responses elicited following an entreaty might be interpreted as a valid measure of preference.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: the next section reviews the literature on protest responses and developments in using entreaties in stated preference studies particularly, but not exclusively, in the use of 'cheap talk scripts' to deal with hypothetical bias. We then introduce the experimental design used in each of our case studies including the criteria used to classify protest responses and the research hypotheses. Following this, we present and critically reflect upon our results and analysis. We conclude with a summary of our main findings and recommendations.
Literature Review
In this paper we are specifically concerned with the problem of protest zeros, a situation which arises where a zero value is reported for a good even though a respondent truly values its provision (see, for example, Mitchell and Carson, 1989) .
Such responses are particularly evident in situations where the good in question has traditionally been provided free of charge (Strazzera et al. 2003; Jakobsson and Dragun, 1996) . There are many reasons for this kind of behaviour but typically it is the result of an objection to some aspect of the valuation process or contingent market: for example, the payment vehicle, the policy intervention, the institutional setting, lack of comprehension of the task, insufficient information, ethical objections or it may simply reflect some form of strategic behaviour such as free-riding (Boyle et al. 2001; Jorgensen et al. 1999 Jorgensen et al. , 2001 Morrison et al. 2000; Strazzera et al. 2003) .
Since protest responses do not reflect the true value of a good including these responses in the final welfare analysis may lead to biased estimates. There is a longstanding debate about how to react to this insight and, in turn, whether to retain or discard such responses for the sake of analysis (see, for example, Halstead et al. 1992) . But, in general, these data are typically excluded from subsequent consideration of valuation responses. In order to do this the analyst is required to identify which responses are true zeros and which are protest zeros. The standard procedure is to use follow-up questions to distinguish between those that state zero because they genuinely do not value the good and those that state zero for some other reason (Mitchell and Carson, 1989) . 1 Clearly, this procedure is reliant on self-reporting and there may be many reasons for a respondent's stated response. For example, Jorgensen and Syme (2000) argue that
respondents not wishing to pay for valid reasons such as budget constraints may also object on the basis of some aspect of the contingent market. 2 The waters are further muddied by the lack of an established protocol on how to identify protest responses.
Indeed, a handful of contributions suggest controversy exists over how to define or identify protest responses (Boyle and Bergstrom, 1999; Jorgensen et al. 1999; Meyerhoff and Liebe, 2006) with some authors considering only payment vehicle rejections as protest zeros while others use wider criteria including insufficient information and ethical objections (Jakobsson and Dragun, 1996) . In effect, two separate analyses of the same good could provide widely different welfare estimates depending on how the analyst interprets these aspects of the data (Jorgensen et al. 1999 ).
There is also debate over the efficacy of censoring protest bids once identified. This stems from concern that the exclusion of protest responses may affect the validity and potential for generalisation of the results if there is evidence of systematic bias amongst those protesting (Bateman et al. 2002; Jorgensen et al. 1999; Mitchell and Carson, 1989; Morrison et al. 2000; Strazzera et al. 2003a) . For example, Jorgensen and Syme (2000) find that censoring protests would bias CV results towards those individuals who favour paying for environmental goods or with higher income. Schlapfer et al. (2004) found that most of their protest zeros were articulated by 'disappointed voters'.
1 Meyerhoff and Liebe (2009) have argued that these debriefing questions are also important in choice experiment (CE) settings. While far less frequently employed than in its CV counterpart, these authors present evidence that protest attributes are related significantly to status quo effects (i.e. choosing the baseline) in CE formats. 2 Meyerhoff and Liebe (2006) investigate possible determinants of protest behaviour and conclude that it is related to a range of factors including notably ethical perceptions about norms of provision for the sorts of (public) good being valued in these studies. Haddad and Howarth (2006) discuss more broadly how ethical considerations and preferences might shape this debate.
As a result of the challenging issues that surround the identification and treatment of protest responses there has been some exploration of alternative ways to deal with protest zeros. Strazzera et al. (2003a) , for example, suggest a sequential procedure, to deal with the sample selection problem which can occur if protestors are significantly different from the censored sample, in CV models with open-ended WTP data. Strazzera et al. (2003b) and Calia and Strazzera (2001) also pursue this important line of inquiry with regards to the statistical challenge posed by this potential sample selection problem. Morrison et al. (2000) use follow-up questions to recode protestors, at the model estimation stage, as being in support of the proposed change if their concerns could be dealt with: for example, if "… an alternative, acceptable way of collecting money could be found …" (p419) and they can afford to pay. In the current study, we take a rather different approach to dealing with the problem of protest responses by exploring a means of reducing the propensity to protest through the use of an entreaty.
Entreaties, such as cheap talk scripts, have been previously used to deal with hypothetical bias. The term 'cheap talk' itself arises from its use in the information, bargaining and game theory literature where it typically refers to the "… cost-less transmission of information and signals …" (Cummings and Taylor, 1999, p650) . In the contingent valuation literature, the term usually refers to a script, typically quite lengthy, that is added to the valuation scenario in order to directly draw respondents' attention to the problem of mis-or over-stating true values. As this could occur in a hypothetical setting, the script directly asks respondents to frame their response as if they were in a real-life setting. For the most part its application has been successfulin terms of its impact on hypothetical bias -albeit with some sensitivity to differing script lengths, respondent experience and payment levels (see, for example, Brown et al. 2003; Cummings and Taylor, 1999; List, 2001; Lusk, 2003; Murphy et al. 2005) .
Previous empirical work has involved both laboratory and field experiments. Each has its merits. The chief virtue of the former lies in its use of a closely-controlled environment allowing an in-depth investigation of behavioural responses such as in Cummings and Taylor's (1999) test of variations of an eight-paragraph script. By contrast, field experiments -as we use in the current paper -mean less control over participant behaviour and, typically, shorter (and less varied) scripts. Some studies have indicated caution might be the watchword in using such scripts in the field (Poe et al. 2002; Aadland and Caplan, 2006) . Other contributions have concluded more positively (Aadland and Caplan, 2003; Bulte et al. 2005; Carlsson et al. 2005) including Lusk (2003) which uses a self-administered format (in a mailed survey) and, in doing so, offers support for the use of cheap talk even in the absence of a moderator to ensure the script is fully read and assimilated. More generally, if the policy relevance of entreaties is to be fully explored it seems important also to test efficacy in the field as well as in the laboratory.
Exploring the merits of entreaties also strikes us as worthwhile in other apparent problem areas in CV applications. Specifically, in this paper, we investigate whether an analogous type of entreaty, i.e. a protest-correcting entreaty, might persuade protestors to reveal their true preferences for a good. Interestingly, this speculation was anticipated in a study of US water quality by Mitchell and Carson (1984) albeit with little divergence being found there between pre-and post-entreaty protest rates.
More recently, Carlsson and Martinsson (2006) find that an entreaty script reduced the proportion of zero WTP responses in their sample, in a CV application to power outages in Sweden. In the current paper, we build on this small but interesting body of research by focusing on entreaties designed to self-correct for protest zeros in two CV applications.
Study Design
We conducted two distinct CV experiments in the United Kingdom (UK). The main objective of Experiment 1 was to test the use of an entreaty to reduce protest zero bids using a split-sample procedure. The survey elicited WTP for protecting tropical biodiversity amongst distant beneficiaries. The proposed policy change was adapted from Bruner et al. (2004) . Respondents were asked to consider a programme which would expand the existing global network of protected areas by 30% (about 3.5 million km 2 ) and further that this additional conservation would consist of 'high priority sites' in developing countries. In Experiment 2, the payment vehicle was the respondents' annual household water bill. It is, in effect, an institutional given that it is the industry that will initiate investments in improving water quality and, as in this case, additions to the water supply (or management of demand) in the UK. The cost of these improvements is then passed on to consumers, subject to regulatory approval, in the form of higher water bills. Nevertheless, despite its realism, using this payment vehicle has been found to create anxieties in respondents related to perceived excessive profits within the industry, controversial privatisation (albeit some years ago), combined with resentment about the current level of (and other changes in) household water bills (e.g. Bateman et al. 2006) .
To reiterate, from the standpoint of eliciting WTP values, these concerns boil down to either uncertainty that the good in question will be provided (Experiment 1) or objections to the payment mechanism itself (Experiment 2). For the CV practitioner the answer to these problems should be to ensure that credible information is provided in the valuation scenario that allays these fears. bias to the extent that asking explicitly for respondents to concentrate on project outcomes divorces their thinking from issues of substance about the processes by which the outcomes are delivered. In this sense then, using entreaties might be viewed 5 Our entreaties are shorter than Cummings and Taylor (1999) 8-paragraph long lab-based cheap talk script but are significantly longer than several of the one-paragraph field-based cheap talk entreaties that have been used (Carlsson, Frykblom and Lagerkvist, 2005; Bulte et al 2005) . Shorter entreaties have been found to be less effective (see Poe et al. 2002) . 6 It should be noted that most CV studies contain some text which could be construed as an entreaty, typically urging respondents to focus solely on the scenarios proposed and realistically evaluate their ability to pay. However, this normally amounts to a line or two of text only and is therefore rather different in scope and content to the more detailed and substantial half page entreaties used in our experiments. As noted, shorter entreaties have been found to be less effective (Poe et al. 2002) . We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out. 7 It can of course be argued that objections to institutional settings or payment vehicles are a true reflection of people's preferences for the bundled good on offer in CV studies, encompassing the outcome of interest and the specific way in which it is to be delivered. However, in both our experiments, we are mostly interested in valuing particular outcomes (i.e. biodiversity conservation and security of water supply). The provision mechanisms were specified in the scenarios for credibility but attempts were made to make them as realistic and as neutral as possible, to minimise their influence on the stated preferences for the outcomes themselves.
better as a 'last resort' and certainly not as a substitute for prior reflection and testing of descriptions of scenarios to be valued.
Willingness to pay, in the valuation scenarios of both Experiments 1 and 2, was assessed in two stages. The first stage was a payment principle question, in which respondents were asked whether in principle they would be willing to contribute to the specified programme. Those responding YES or DON'T KNOW went on to the second stage of the valuation scenario (and those stating NO went straight to followup questions). At the second stage, respondents were asked to report their maximum WTP per annum. The elicitation format in both experiments was a payment ladder.
Protests were identified at both stages of the valuation process. At the first stage, [
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
The experiments differed in the way the entreaty was administered to respondents. This is described in Figure 1 . In Experiment 1, we used a split-sample design with the additional script inserted immediately after the valuation scenario and prior to the payment principle question in one version of the questionnaire. The other questionnaire version was identical except for the absence of the entreaty. In Experiment 2, a within sample test was employed. If a respondent gave a protest zero, in response to the payment principle question, that respondent was then presented with the entreaty text. The respondent was then asked if, in the light of this additional information, he or she would like to re-consider their initial answer to the payment principle question. If the answer was in the affirmative then that respondent was asked -in the second payment ladder stage of the valuation scenario -to report his or her maximum WTP. Those respondents who had originally stated YES (or DON'T KNOW) in response to the payment principle question but were not prepared to pay anything at the second stage were also asked to state the main reason for this. Again, to the extent that this answer could be interpreted as a protest zero, the respondent was presented with the entreaty text and then asked if he or she wished to make a revised WTP response. Note that the entreaty was administered only once to any one respondent.
Broadly speaking, a protest in the case of either experiment was defined as any zero response given on the basis of: (i) concerns over the credibility of the proposed scenario or objections to the process whereby the specified change would be provided; (ii) objection to some aspect of the payment vehicle, for example, 'too high water bills' or 'lack of trust in the institution', 'excessive profits' or 'government should pay'; and, (iii) objection to some other aspect of the valuation scenario such as, for example, 'I need more information'. In large part, the classification of protests relies on a strong element of subjectivity with different studies reporting different methods of classification. Nevertheless, the latter two categories are frequently identified in the CV literature as protest responses. The decision also to include the first type of response was due to our contention that these types of respondents were not revealing their true preferences for the achieved outcome of the proposed programme. Responses which were considered to be valid zeros were those that reflected a genuine lack of economic value for the good, for example, 'I don't care about this issue', 'I prefer to spend my money on other things' or 'I can't afford it'.
The inclusion of the entreaties was examined primarily in terms of its effect on the incidence and likelihood of protest zero responses. We speculate therefore that the inclusion of the entreaty would result in: (i) in Experiment 1, a lower number of protests in the entreaty survey version than in the non-entreaty version; and (ii) in Experiment 2, a lower number of protests post-entreaty than pre-entreaty. Although the main purpose of the entreaty scripts was to examine their effectiveness in reducing the number of protest responses, we are also interested in examining whether these would have any effect on WTP. This allows us to comment subsequently on whether WTP values, given in the light of the entreaties, are significantly different to the WTP of either the without entreaty sample (Experiment 1) or the pre-entreaty sample (Experiment 2).
Results
In Experiment 1, the survey was administered using a drop-off and mail-back procedure and was delivered to a total of 1836 households in six randomly selected areas of London in January 2006. In total 601 usable questionnaires were returned. In [ these respondents as "new entrants" (to the contingent market) in order to distinguish them from the initial valid positive or zero WTP (of "original" or "old entrants").
Zero Willingness to Pay Responses
We report the main reasons for zero WTP categorized into valid and protest responses in Table 2 . In Experiment 1, on average, 23% of respondents with the additional script and 32% without it were not willing to pay anything towards the proposed change.
The main reasons for zero WTP responses were found to be roughly similar between treatments with, for example, the most frequently cited reason -'cannot afford to contribute' -accounting for 27% and 25% of all zero responses with and without the entreaty respectively. 9 Of the valid reasons for giving a zero WTP, the most notable difference between treatments is the higher proportion reporting 'prefer to spend money on other things' which was 1% under the entreaty treatment compared to 7% without it. On average, in both treatments, just over half of the reasons given for zero WTP consisted of protest responses.
In the case of Experiment 2, column 4 in Table 2 indicates that 224 respondents stated a zero WTP (30% of this portion of the sample). Out of these respondents, protest zeros clearly predominate and represent 25% of our total sample. These protest responses were motivated by a number of objections, most prominently 'paying higher water bills'. The data in column 4 of the table illustrate the incidence of reasons for protest zeros before any of these protesting respondents received the entreaty text. All those respondents identified as protestors then received the entreaty.
The final column of the table focuses on "new entrants" only, that is, those who changed their mind (56 respondents in all) after the entreaty. The column depicts the original reason "new entrants" gave for their initial (pre-entreaty) protest zero.
Amongst "new entrants", the largest single protest category is also objecting to paying higher water bills, which accounts for almost one third (29%) of total "new entrants" in this experiment. However, looking across other protest reasons, 40% of "new entrants" originally had given reasons for their initial protest based on some form of antipathy towards the water industry (whether this be perceived excessive profits, ownership, responsibility or efficiency), while another 24% had expressed an initial dissatisfaction with the specified project itself. In Experiment 1, some 10% and 4% of protestors (in the "no entreaty" and "entreaty" respectively) stated that they were not willing to pay for a range of (self) articulated reasons which did not fall exactly within the key categories outlined in Table 2 . We therefore grouped them under 'Other reasons' for simplicity. For the most part, these broadly relate to protests connected to specific aspects of the payment vehicle and miscellaneous concerns about the way in which any such conservation scheme would work. The incidence of these miscellaneous concerns appears to be lower in the entreaty version of the questionnaire. 10 There is some ambiguity, as we noted earlier, about the classification of responses such as these as protests. Thus, if there were credible alternative options to the ones presented in Experiment 2 that might deliver the same reductions in the risk of water use restrictions, then it could well be argued that at least two of the protest categories in Table 2 could equally be construed as valid zeros. In the project presented to respondents, however, a reservoir was presented as the main solution to water supply
Effect of Entreaty on Incidence of Protest Zeros
The top half of Table 3 indicates that, in Experiment 1, at the first stage of the valuation exercise only a small number of respondents protested to the payment principle question. In the entreaty version only 2.7% of the respondents answering the payment principle question provided a protest NO compared to 4.0% without the additional script. The entreaty, however, had a much more noticeable effect at the second stage of the valuation exercise (payment ladder) which received a higher proportion of protest responses. Hence, the additional script was associated with a rate of protest of 8.9% compared to 13.7% in the version of the questionnaire without the script. Overall, the entreaty treatment reduced protests by 34%. 11 One interpretation of these results is that the entreaty had a reasonably large effect in reducing protest zeros in Experiment 1. However, confidence in this interpretation must be qualified. One reason for this is that, across the two treatments, the distribution between protest and valid zeros (i.e. each as a proportion of all zeros) is very similar. This is particularly so at the payment principle stage. We cannot therefore discount the possibility that the entreaty had a blunter impact than intended in terms of influencing the tendency to state both protest and valid zeros (and thus affect the readiness of respondents to state a positive WTP more generally). 12 We return to this issue later.
[ TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
The bottom half of Table 3 indicates that, in Experiment 2, the clear majority of respondents stating protest reasons for not being prepared to pay anything did so at the payment principle stage of the valuation exercise (about 24%). Very few respondents either answered DON'T KNOW or YES to the payment principle issues, together with a wider suite of complementary measures that included fixing leaky pipes. Evidence suggests that (whatever its merits or otherwise in other respects) the reservoir is in fact crucial to the risk reductions we specified being realised (WRSE, 2006) . 11 Chi-squared tests revealed no significant difference at this payment principle stage between the two treatments. For the payment ladder stage, however, chi-squared tests indicate that protest responses were statistically significantly lower (5% sig. level). 12 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
question and then subsequently stated a zero WTP when presented with the payment ladder (less than 1%). This is in contrast to Experiment 1 where the majority of protest responses occurred at the second stage of the valuation exercise, i.e. at the payment ladder stage.
The reason for the differential occurrence of protests between experiments is likely due to the diverse valuation contexts they cover. Experiment 2 involves paying higher household water bills to water companies for reducing the risk of water use restrictions. The piloting stages of our research showed that some people, for example, were very unhappy with what they perceived as water companies' excessive profits. We would expect some of those feelings to translate into protests at the payment principle stage of the valuation exercise as people take the first available opportunity to vent their discontent about paying higher water rates, companies making high profits, not paying for improvements out of these profits and so on.
Conversely, Experiment 1 dealt with protection of tropical biodiversity via an international fund, which our preliminary research showed most people tended to support in principle. Here the objections started when people considered more closely the details of the programme being offered in order to value its benefits. Hence, it is arguably then at the second (payment ladder) stage of the valuation exercise that we would expect some people to start worrying about effectiveness of the proposed programme, or about possible corruption among other reasons.
Recall that the entreaty, in Experiment 2, was designed to see if respondents registering an initial protest zero might reflect on this response, in the light of some additional information about why the valuation question was being asked, and revise whether they would be willing to pay. This design means that the WTP data, in effect, can be analysed with and without the revised WTP responses: respectively, 'after entreaty' and 'before entreaty'. Hence, in the bottom half of Table 3, under Experiment 2, the data in the columns 'no entreaty/ pre-entreaty' takes a respondent's first valuation answer as final. By contrast, entries in the columns 'entreaty/ post entreaty' take into account the revised valuation answers of protestors (as well as taking the first answer of everybody else). Notably, the entreaty had the effect of reducing the ultimate number of protests quite substantially, with about 30% of the initial protestors (56 respondents in total) changing their minds in the light of the entreaty. As a result, following the entreaty being administered, protest responses are about 17.5% of the overall sample.
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To further explore in a multivariate context the effect of the entreaties on the probability of protesting we ran logit models for both datasets. In Experiment 1, the logit model explores the likelihood of protesting at the second (payment ladder) stage of the valuation where most of the protests occurred. The dependent variable was coded 1 if the respondent protested and 0 if not. The results are reported in Table 4 .
As expected, the entreaty dummy variable was found to be a significant determinant of the probability of protesting (at the 5% significance level). 14 The negative sign on the coefficient confirms the findings of the non-parametric results, namely that the inclusion of the script significantly reduces the likelihood of protesting. Furthermore, the probability of protesting was found to increase significantly with income and amongst respondents who considered the environment to be the least important priority for additional government funding. 15 By contrast, respondents with degreelevel education or above and respondents who stated they undertook routinely 'environmental-friendly' tasks (as proxied by recycling often or always) were significantly less likely to protest. Protest responses also declined with the perceived likelihood that the protected areas would result in long-term conservation, thus suggesting that belief in the efficacy of the scheme is a critical bridge between preferences being translated into positive WTP amounts for specific conservation schemes.
13 Note that in Experiment 2 (and unlike Experiment 1) the proportion of valid zeros is invariant between treatments by design, i.e. those stating valid zeros did not receive the entreaty. 14 In this experiment, we also investigated whether our entreaty was more effective at reducing the propensity to protest amongst certain types of individuals. This follows on from the literature using cheap talk to deal with hypothetical bias, where there has been some evidence to suggest that cheap talk is more effective at reducing stated WTP for certain types of individual (see Aadland and Caplan, 2003; List, 2001; Lusk, 2003) . To investigate this, we re-examined the entreaty effect on protestors by comparing the characteristics of those protesting with and without the additional script (using student ttests, Mann-Whitney tests and chi-square tests). Overall, the key socio-demographic and attitudinal variables were not significantly different for protestors between treatments suggesting that the entreaty was similarly effective for most respondent types. These summary statistics can be found in Table 1 and Table A .2 (in the Appendix). However, given the relatively small number of protestors we would suggest treating these outcomes with caution. 15 This involved a ranking exercise of five general issues: crime, education, the National Health Service, environment and poverty. This finding itself raises the possibility that, in some degree, protests might be related to (conventionally) 'valid' reasoning after all. We have taken, however, the standard practice in identifying protestors using a debrief response question immediately following the WTP question. It is plausible though that digging further than this convention entails might lead one to speculate that -for some respondents -protest motives might sit alongside valid reasons for not being willing to pay.
[ supply problems -specifically, low water pressure, discoloration and supply interruptions -is also found to have a mixed effect on the probability of a change of mind. Whilst experiencing low water pressure increases the probability of revising the original protest answer, water supply interruptions have no effect and water discolouration significantly reduces the likelihood of a revised answer.
[ What does emerge as significant is whether or not respondents found elements of the questionnaire difficult, although again the direction of the effect is not uniform. In all, three such variables are included. The first is the respondent's own rating of how difficult he or she found understanding the visual and textual information and preliminary questions relating to changes in water supply disruption risk reduction.
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The second is again based on the respondent's own assessment but this time relates to whether, in a concluding question, the respondent stated he or she found the survey difficult overall. The third is based on the interviewer's assessment of how difficult 16 In total there were two risk questions of this type. Both questions were designed to familiarise respondents with, and test understanding of, a visual representation (10×10 grids) of 'before' and 'after' water supply interruption risks along with numerical (risk) information.
the respondent found, in particular, the valuation exercise. In the case of the first indicator, the finding is apparently that expressing difficulty with the risk (change) aspect of the valuation scenario is associated with less likelihood of revising a protest response in the light of the entreaty. However, in the case of the latter two variables, experiencing, or being perceived to experience, difficulty in the survey and the valuation questions increased the likelihood of a respondent, registering a protest zero, revising his or her response following the entreaty text being administered.
Effect of Entreaty on WTP Estimates
While the main purpose of the entreaty, in both experiments, is to reduce protests, potential effects on WTP are also of interest. The results of the non-parametric estimation of mean and median WTP using the raw data, with protestors and outliers removed, are reported in Table 6 (with further details on the frequency distribution of responses to the payment ladder being reported in Tables A.1 Table 3 (top half) . It thus appears that the entreaty, in addition to reducing the number of protests zeros, has also had a minor reducing effect on the number of valid zeros in this experiment. In other words the additional script appears to have encouraged some respondents whom would otherwise have reported a 'valid' zero to instead report positive WTP bids.
It is interesting to ask why we might have fewer valid zeros under the entreaty treatment. A candidate answer might start with the observation that, as discussed, the standard procedure for identifying protests is crude. This, in the case of Experiment 1, may have resulted in some respondents in the 'no entreaty' treatment being incorrectly identified as 'valid' zeros. If so, then it is reasonable to assume that, under the entreaty treatment, incorrectly identified 'valid' zeros would be swayed to report their true WTP rather than a zero bid, explaining the lower proportion of 'valid' zeros.
Alternatively, as also noted previously, it could be that the entreaty itself had a blunter impact than intended in terms of influencing the tendency to state both protest and valid zeros, and therefore increasing the likelihood of a positive WTP answer. Note that the within-sample design of Experiment 2 avoids this reduction in valid zeros (or, for that matter, any potential effects on initial positive WTP amounts) given that it is focused only on those respondents identified as stating protest zeros.
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Finally, to explore the influence of the entreaties on the positive WTP estimates, we ran interval regression models (Cameron and Huppert, 1989; Haab and McConnell 2002) , for each experiment, using maximum likelihood estimation procedures to identify the main determinants of positive WTP values. The results of the regression model, for the pooled data (entreaty and non-entreaty treatments) for Experiment 1, are reported in Table 7 . 19 Willingness to pay is found to increase with: income, membership of environmental organizations and ranking of environment as a priority.
A key finding is for the variable 'Entreaty(1)'. This is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if a respondent received the treatment that included the entreaty and 0
otherwise. It appears that (positive) WTP is not influenced significantly by the inclusion of the additional script given the insignificant coefficient on this dummy variable.
[ In order to give a little more context to this result, we ask the following question.
What would we 'predict' the average WTP of "new entrants" to be based on relevant socio-economic and demographic characteristics as well as other observed responses?
We provide an approximate answer to this firstly by running an interval regression (using the same explanatory variables as in between valid positives ("old entrants") and "new entrants" are illustrated in Table   A .3 in the Appendix to this paper. We reflect further on this finding below in the discussion that follows this section.
Discussion
Taken as a whole, our results appear to provide evidence that entreaties can be partially effective in dealing with the problem of protest zeros, reducing their occurrence by about a third in both our experiments. Moreover, this is achieved at little cost in terms of over-burdening the valuation scenario given the relative brevity of each of the additional texts. In both cases, the entreaty texts were designed explicitly to allay the concerns of potential (Experiment 1) and actual (Experiment 2) protestors with a focus on reasons that, we knew from earlier stages of the research, commonly underpinned protest answers in both of the policy contexts examined.
The question remains as to whether an entreaty is actually needed at all. Surely, it might be argued, any well-devised valuation scenario is the end-product of a research process, involving qualitative testing, in-depth interviews and so on. As such the final design will have minimised problems such as 'high' protest rates. This is an entirely reasonable argument and is not nullified by the inclusion of entreaty texts such as in this paper. In large part, motives expressed in justification of protest zeros, in both of our experiments, were connected to beliefs about the process of how a policy change is provided rather than the outcome of the policy change itself. To the extent that such beliefs cannot straightforwardly be allayed within a conventional valuation scenario, the entreaty text serves a useful purpose. Moreover, using a within-sample approach as in the case of Experiment 2, it is possible to analyse the data with or without the (positive) WTP values of those who initially protested but subsequently revised their answer.
Both entreaties appear to have led to a significant reduction in protests. Nevertheless, it is evident that, in Experiment 2 for example, only a minority (about a third) of protestors changed their mind. By this same token, however, this also means that the majority of protestors stuck to their original response even in the light of the entreaty text. In this sense, the entreaty appears to be only a partial answer at best. In addition, there may be reasons to be cautious in any interpretation of the WTP responses of the one-third or so respondents that the entreaty appears to 'return' to the sample.
A positive construal (of these responses), for example, in the case of Experiment 2, is that the entreaty text could have given respondents an opportunity to 'pause for breath' and further reflect on the specified policy change. This might have been particularly useful for those protestors who stated, precipitously, that they would not even pay in principle. Indeed, one could query the efficacy of a payment principle question that arguably permits 'easy protest'. We can only speculate, in Experiment 2, about how many protests there would have been if respondents were routed straight to the second stage valuation question. Evidence from Experiment 1, however, indicates that a significant proportion of protest responses can also occur at the payment stage as well. Less positively, and again in Experiment 2, we cannot rule out the possibility that respondents -on being taken through the entreaty text -may have understood it as a form of suasion or tacit cue that their initial (considered) answer was 'wrong'. By implication then, these respondents may have reasoned that they simply should revise their response accordingly.
In this context, there are divergent interpretations of our finding, from the parametric analysis, that the mean of the positive WTP values of "new entrants" (in Experiment
2) was about one third lower than the corresponding mean for non-protestors (who had a positive WTP for the specified change). On the one hand, one reading of this finding is that it could be taken as an indication that the former group did not appear to have been tempted, on average, to 'over-correct' (which is also apparently the case for Experiment 1, where the entreaty did not lead to an inflation of positive WTP values). On this view, the lower (parametric) mean of this group could be -on the face of it -plausible given the earlier reservations of these respondents about paying for the policy change.
On the other hand, and by contrast, it could be that this lower WTP is symptomatic of a reaction to the implied suasion in an entreaty. Put another way, those who stop their protest -i.e. our "new entrants" -might do this for genuine reasons related to their preferences (and which the entreaty uncovers) or they could feel 'obligated' to offer a positive WTP response which, on average, they keep -for motives that we do not observe -low. While, it is worth pointing out that we did seek to make the entreaty text in both experiments as neutral as possible, we cannot dismiss completely rule out the latter conjecture.
We can state, however, that the actual WTP of these "new entrants" is rather lower than what would be predicted based on e.g. the characteristics of these respondents.
Depending on the extent to which we are prepared to assume that WTP primarily is determined by these observed influences, this might give cause for reflection about the efficacy of these revised WTP responses. Alternatively, it could reinforce the case for getting such respondents (i.e. "new entrants") back within the analysis rather than disregarding their initial protest responses (as they apparently think rather differently about the policy change than inspection of observable predictors would suggest).
Clearly, we are in danger of raising more questions than we are able to answer, given our available data. Yet this ambiguity itself perhaps urges some caution about drawing overly optimistic and premature conclusions about using entreaties to talk respondents 'out of their (actual or potential) protests.
Moving beyond claim and counter-claim in order to understand more directly why a protestor may or may not revise a protest response could suggest the need for detailed qualitative testing as a future contribution. Perhaps more useful still could be the testing of different variations of an entreaty in order perhaps to get at the issue of the impact of underlying incentives (conveyed within the text). Arguably, this is something that would be best undertaken in an experimental setting in the laboratory rather than the field.
Conclusions
While drawn from distinct policy contexts, the purpose of both the CV experiments outlined in this paper was to test the usefulness of entreaties as a means to tackle protest zeros. In our first experiment (Experiment 1), the primary reason that respondents used to justify a protest zero response can be summed up as an inability to believe that the requisite tropical forest conservation can be achieved in practice. In our second experiment (Experiment 2), protesting respondents tended to state that antipathy towards paying higher water bills and the privatised water companies more generally determined their reaction to a proposed scheme to reduce the risk of household water supply interruptions.
In both cases, we explored whether an entreaty text can influence the likelihood that a respondent will protest. We did so, in Experiment 1, using a split sample approach.
Almost half of respondents received a treatment that included an additional text designed to anticipate protest motives in eliciting WTP for conservation schemes. The remaining respondents received an otherwise identical treatment which did not include this additional text. In Experiment 2, we used a within-sample approach.
Respondents stating a protest zero were read an additional entreaty text and then asked if they wished to revise their WTP response.
In both experiments, roughly the same proportions -about one-third -of protest respondents possibly were swayed by the entreaty text. In the case of Experiment 2, a total of 56 respondents who stated an initial protest zero opted to change their mind and so subsequently stated a positive WTP amount following the administration of the entreaty text. In Experiment 1, however, this inference about the influence of the entreaty is more indirect and is based on the difference in protest rates between the samples receiving the entreaty and non-entreaty treatments.
Notably, in both cases, the entreaty appears to have little effect on (non-parametric) mean WTP, calculated after removal of protestors. In other respects, there are notable differences in the results. In Experiment 1, respondents tended to protest at the payment elicitation stage of the valuation scenario rather than the payment principle stage. In Experiment 2 the opposite was found. Furthermore, in Experiment 2, mean WTP of those who state positive amounts at second time of asking, on average, was significantly lower than the analogous mean positive WTP of those who stated these amounts at the first time of asking. In Experiment 1, however, the entreaty had no significant effect on stated positive WTP amounts although it did seem to lead to a reduction in the number of valid zeros (and reflected in the fact that both protest and valid zeroes were reduced in rough proportion between non-entreaty and entreaty versions).
Interpretation of these findings involves some ambiguity. We appear to 'get back' Some people have stated that they would not be willing to pay anything toward the protected area programme, not because they do not value it but because they do not really think the proposed change is possible.
For example, some people felt that such a large expansion is not possible; some did not believe local institutions would be able to effectively manage the areas; whilst others simply did not trust institutions in the developing countries to put all the money into the protected areas due to corruption.
These are all valid concerns however they do unfortunately mean that it is not possible for us to tell whether or not these people place any value on ensuring these tropical species and ecosystems are conserved.
To do this we need estimates from people about how much it is worth to them, if anything, to ensure the protected area programme takes place.
So, for the purposes of this valuation we ask that you set aside any doubts you may have about the plausibility of the proposed expansion and focus instead on how much it would mean to you if these outcomes were truly in place.
Figure A.1(b): Entreaty used in Experiment 2
In this study we have found other people such as yourself say that they would not be prepared to pay anything for reducing the risk of future water use restrictions. This is not because they don't care about this risk or cannot afford to contribute something to reduce it. Rather it is because these people think, for example, that the Government should pay or that they have lost trust in the water companies.
It is understandable that people sometimes feel like this. But it does mean unfortunately that it is not possible for us to tell whether or not such people think that reducing the risk of water use restrictions is important or not. For that, we need to know whether it really is worth anything at all to these people to reduce the chance of the water shortages -in other words, whether you believe you would be better off or not.
So in answering this next question, please put aside any concerns you may have about water companies, how well regulated they are, or your opinion of the Government. Instead, please focus only on what it would be really worth to you and your household to reduce the risk of future water use restrictions. I know this is not an easy thing to do but it is really important for us to try to find out about the benefits of reducing these risks for everyone. Note: Expressed as % of zero responses. The columns may not sum to 100% due to rounding error. n.a. = not applicable c In Experiment 2, the entries in the columns under the "No Entreaty" heading refer to the initial numbers and frequencies of protest and valid zeros at either the payment principle or payment ladder stages. After administration of the Entreaty some respondents changed their original response from a zero to a positive WTP. The entries in the columns under the "Entreaty" heading refer to those protest and valid zeros which still remain after the administration of the entreaty text (i.e. from people who did not change their mind). The Entreaty text was administered after the valuation question, either after the payment principle question or the payment ladder. This depended on at what stage the respondent protested. Protest zeros can differ, therefore, between the before and after entreaty administration at either the payment principle or ladder stages. Valid zeros do not differ by design (i.e. these respondents did not receive the entreaty text). Note: These estimates are based on the raw data using lower bound of interval only. In Experiment 1, the Entreaty split had 3 missing observations while the No Entreaty had 5 missing observations. 
